Amidst increasing accusations against Colombo of Sri Lankan troopers alleged involvement in extra-judicial killings and the terror-campaign let loose on Jaffna islets, Dr. Palitha Kohona, the Head of Sri Lanka Peace Secretariat, said last week that he suspects there might be contacts with the paramilitary cadres and the lower rank Sri Lankan troops.
Dr. Kohona, who, in keeping with the position of the Sri Lankan government, had been denying any link between anti-LTTE Tamil paramilitary groups and the Sri Lankan military, changed his position, in an exclusive interview to the Reuters.
“[...] human contacts that were established during the three years of ceasefire may have continued. I don’t have any evidence as to whether they are continuing or not, but we suspect there might be,” the Head of Sri Lankan Peace Secretariat was quoted by the Reuters.
“It is not going to be an easy task to ensure that government soldiers break off all their contacts that existed previously with the now Karuna’s men,” Kohona further said.
He continued: “...given human nature, I wouldn’t be surprised that people fraternise with each other ... They fraternise, they drink with each other, they visit each others’ homes. As to what happens beyond that I do not know.”
This is the first time, however, a Sri Lankan official has attempted to provide an explanation to the charges of paramilitary - military links.
The Liberation Tigers have been accusing Colombo of violating a crucial clause of the Ceasefire Agreement. The clause 1.8 of the February 2002 agreement states that the Sri Lankan military should disarm the Tamil paramilitary groups within thirty days of signing..
Although the Government of Sri Lanka again agreed to disarm the armed groups at the Geneva talks in February this year, paramilitary violence resumed within three days of the negotiations ending.
The paramilitary violence, primarily located in the eastern province later spread to Vavuniya and Jaffna and, amidst counter attacks by the LTTE, has spiralled into a ‘low intensity war’ according to international ceasefire monitors.
It has also derailed Norwegian-brokered peace talks between the LTTE and the government.
“With the escalating paramilitary violence in the form of regular attacks on LTTE cadres and Tamil civilians ... I gravely doubt whether the Norwegians can perform any miracle to persuade the Tamil Tigers to participate in the peace talks,” LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham told Reuters.
The Tigers say talks are out until attacks on their fighters stop and the government creates a “conducive atmosphere”.
“This [Kohona’s] confession clearly indicates the reluctance on the part of the government to sever relations with renegades or to contain their criminal violence,” Balasingham said.
On April 30, an elite commando unit of the LTTE launched a surprise attack inside the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) controlled Welikanda in Batticaloa- Polonnaruwa border, killing at least 18 cadres of the paramilitary Karuna Group. Tigers also said they killed five Sri Lankan soldiers, including a Captain rank officer, who took part in a paramilitary rescue operation.
Since the defection in April 2004 to the Sri Lanka Army of the renegade LTTE commander, Karuna, following the crushing of his rebellion against the LTTE leadership the violence against LTTE cadres and supporters has escalated sharply.
Apart from prominent academics, journalists and political activists supportive of the Tamil nationalist struggle, many ordinary civilians suspected of sympathy for the Tigers and some with relatives in the LTTE have been murdered.
Following the collapse of his rebellion in the face of a lightning offensive by the LTTE over the Easter 2004 weekend, Karuna escaped to Army-controlled territory with a handful of loyalists. They were given safe escort to Colombo by the Sri Lanka armed forces.
Kaunra cadres have been operating out of safehouses in Colombo provided by Sri Lankan Military Intelligence (MI), deserters from his ranks say. At least one Colombo safehouse was attacked by suspected LTTE commanders in late 2004, resulting in the deaths of eight paramilitaries and their MI handler.
Karuna himself established a close relationship with the one-time head of Military Intelligence, Sri Lanka Army Major General Shantha Kottegoda. It was during Kottegoda’s - then promoted to Lt. Gen. - tenure as head of the SLA that paramilitary violence against LTTE cadres and, primarily, supporters became widespread.
Dr. Kohona, who, in keeping with the position of the Sri Lankan government, had been denying any link between anti-LTTE Tamil paramilitary groups and the Sri Lankan military, changed his position, in an exclusive interview to the Reuters.
“[...] human contacts that were established during the three years of ceasefire may have continued. I don’t have any evidence as to whether they are continuing or not, but we suspect there might be,” the Head of Sri Lankan Peace Secretariat was quoted by the Reuters.
“It is not going to be an easy task to ensure that government soldiers break off all their contacts that existed previously with the now Karuna’s men,” Kohona further said.
He continued: “...given human nature, I wouldn’t be surprised that people fraternise with each other ... They fraternise, they drink with each other, they visit each others’ homes. As to what happens beyond that I do not know.”
This is the first time, however, a Sri Lankan official has attempted to provide an explanation to the charges of paramilitary - military links.
The Liberation Tigers have been accusing Colombo of violating a crucial clause of the Ceasefire Agreement. The clause 1.8 of the February 2002 agreement states that the Sri Lankan military should disarm the Tamil paramilitary groups within thirty days of signing..
Although the Government of Sri Lanka again agreed to disarm the armed groups at the Geneva talks in February this year, paramilitary violence resumed within three days of the negotiations ending.
The paramilitary violence, primarily located in the eastern province later spread to Vavuniya and Jaffna and, amidst counter attacks by the LTTE, has spiralled into a ‘low intensity war’ according to international ceasefire monitors.
It has also derailed Norwegian-brokered peace talks between the LTTE and the government.
“With the escalating paramilitary violence in the form of regular attacks on LTTE cadres and Tamil civilians ... I gravely doubt whether the Norwegians can perform any miracle to persuade the Tamil Tigers to participate in the peace talks,” LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham told Reuters.
The Tigers say talks are out until attacks on their fighters stop and the government creates a “conducive atmosphere”.
“This [Kohona’s] confession clearly indicates the reluctance on the part of the government to sever relations with renegades or to contain their criminal violence,” Balasingham said.
On April 30, an elite commando unit of the LTTE launched a surprise attack inside the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) controlled Welikanda in Batticaloa- Polonnaruwa border, killing at least 18 cadres of the paramilitary Karuna Group. Tigers also said they killed five Sri Lankan soldiers, including a Captain rank officer, who took part in a paramilitary rescue operation.
Since the defection in April 2004 to the Sri Lanka Army of the renegade LTTE commander, Karuna, following the crushing of his rebellion against the LTTE leadership the violence against LTTE cadres and supporters has escalated sharply.
Apart from prominent academics, journalists and political activists supportive of the Tamil nationalist struggle, many ordinary civilians suspected of sympathy for the Tigers and some with relatives in the LTTE have been murdered.
Following the collapse of his rebellion in the face of a lightning offensive by the LTTE over the Easter 2004 weekend, Karuna escaped to Army-controlled territory with a handful of loyalists. They were given safe escort to Colombo by the Sri Lanka armed forces.
Kaunra cadres have been operating out of safehouses in Colombo provided by Sri Lankan Military Intelligence (MI), deserters from his ranks say. At least one Colombo safehouse was attacked by suspected LTTE commanders in late 2004, resulting in the deaths of eight paramilitaries and their MI handler.
Karuna himself established a close relationship with the one-time head of Military Intelligence, Sri Lanka Army Major General Shantha Kottegoda. It was during Kottegoda’s - then promoted to Lt. Gen. - tenure as head of the SLA that paramilitary violence against LTTE cadres and, primarily, supporters became widespread.