Whilst campaigning for this week’s presidential elections, the main opposition United National Party (UNP) has been pushing for a post-poll consensus between it and the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) on the ethnic question.
Such a consensus would make the Sinhala polity, of which the two – along with the ultra-nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) – are the main players, less vulnerable to pressures to accommodate the island’s minority groups, Tamil, Estate Tamil and Muslim alike.
More importantly, it would form a broad Sinhala front against Tamil political aspirations.
Last Monday Prof G. L. Peiris, former Constitutional Affairs Minister and UNP stalwart, pledged that if its candidate, Ranil Wickremesinghe, won, the UNP would seek agreement with the SLFP for a federal resolution to the conflict, while firmly stating “there is no compromising on anything that goes against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.”
Whilst the notion of federalism is accepted in principle by both the UNP and SLFP (though it has been vehemently rejected by the latter’s Presidential candidate, Mahinda Rajapakse), they have very different conceptions from the Tamils as to what powers ought to be devolved to the Northeast – the JVP is resolutely opposed even to the notion of federalism.
On Saturday, Wickremasinghe also called for a consensus, aruging that there should be no enmity between the UNP and SLFP post-election and that working together would prove more fruitful for both Sinhala parties’ interests.
“If there is a consensus between us, we will also be able to end political enmity,” he stated.
What such a consensus entails for accommodation of interests of minority groups whose bargaining power is weakened by the denial of ‘king maker’ was left unsaid. But the contours were hinted at in Wickremasinghe’s next statements: “I will never betray the country but unite it by meting out justice to all the communities.”
Prof. Peiris also called for “consultation with the major political party in the South, the SLFP. There is no way of reaching a solution without a consensus being first reached with the SLFP.”
Wickremasinghe attempted earlier this month to meet with of outgoing president Chandrika Kumaratunga, who heads the SLFP and obtain her backing for his consensual vision.
Though he finally met with her outside the confidence of SLFP candidate Rajapakse, who President Kumaratunga is party-bound to support, Wickremasinghe apparently failed to obtain her backing.
In a letter requesting President Kumaratunga’s audience in October, Wickremasinghe argued: “I urge you with all sincerity not to allow the peace process to become the subject of national division. Instead we should seek to build further upon the platform of consensus that has already been developed between the UNP and the SLFP. Future generations will not forgive us should we fail to seize this hour and the opportunity it offers.”
These attempts towards a consensus with the SLFP mark the shift in UNP policy and is a u-turn away from its stance in 2001, after the SLFP approached then-Prime Minister Wickremasinghe to form a national government.
Wickremasinghe first responded that the UNP could not be part of a government rooted in Sinhala hegemonism at the expense of minorities.
However, one week after these incontrovertible statements against a UNP-SLFP alliance, the UNP, with the support of Peiris, agreed to form a government of “National Reconciliation.”
During his term as Prime Minister – from late 2001 to November 2003, Wickremesinghe repeatedly sought conciliation with a hostile Kumaratunga, but was repeatedly rebuffed.
Ultimately, the President – whose office wields extraordinary powers, compared to Palriament and the cabinet – seized three ministries from Wickremesinghe in November 2003, precipitating a governing crisis.
Several months later, in April 2004, an alliance between Kumaratunga’s SLFP and the JVP toppled Wickremesinghe’s UNP- led government.
As Sri Lankans go to the polls this week, Kumaratunga’s alliance continues to rule, but as a vulnerable minority government, the JVP having walked out in June 2005 in disgust at her plans to sign an aid-sharing deal with the Tamil Tigers.
Such a consensus would make the Sinhala polity, of which the two – along with the ultra-nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) – are the main players, less vulnerable to pressures to accommodate the island’s minority groups, Tamil, Estate Tamil and Muslim alike.
More importantly, it would form a broad Sinhala front against Tamil political aspirations.
Last Monday Prof G. L. Peiris, former Constitutional Affairs Minister and UNP stalwart, pledged that if its candidate, Ranil Wickremesinghe, won, the UNP would seek agreement with the SLFP for a federal resolution to the conflict, while firmly stating “there is no compromising on anything that goes against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.”
Whilst the notion of federalism is accepted in principle by both the UNP and SLFP (though it has been vehemently rejected by the latter’s Presidential candidate, Mahinda Rajapakse), they have very different conceptions from the Tamils as to what powers ought to be devolved to the Northeast – the JVP is resolutely opposed even to the notion of federalism.
On Saturday, Wickremasinghe also called for a consensus, aruging that there should be no enmity between the UNP and SLFP post-election and that working together would prove more fruitful for both Sinhala parties’ interests.
“If there is a consensus between us, we will also be able to end political enmity,” he stated.
What such a consensus entails for accommodation of interests of minority groups whose bargaining power is weakened by the denial of ‘king maker’ was left unsaid. But the contours were hinted at in Wickremasinghe’s next statements: “I will never betray the country but unite it by meting out justice to all the communities.”
Prof. Peiris also called for “consultation with the major political party in the South, the SLFP. There is no way of reaching a solution without a consensus being first reached with the SLFP.”
Wickremasinghe attempted earlier this month to meet with of outgoing president Chandrika Kumaratunga, who heads the SLFP and obtain her backing for his consensual vision.
Though he finally met with her outside the confidence of SLFP candidate Rajapakse, who President Kumaratunga is party-bound to support, Wickremasinghe apparently failed to obtain her backing.
In a letter requesting President Kumaratunga’s audience in October, Wickremasinghe argued: “I urge you with all sincerity not to allow the peace process to become the subject of national division. Instead we should seek to build further upon the platform of consensus that has already been developed between the UNP and the SLFP. Future generations will not forgive us should we fail to seize this hour and the opportunity it offers.”
These attempts towards a consensus with the SLFP mark the shift in UNP policy and is a u-turn away from its stance in 2001, after the SLFP approached then-Prime Minister Wickremasinghe to form a national government.
Wickremasinghe first responded that the UNP could not be part of a government rooted in Sinhala hegemonism at the expense of minorities.
However, one week after these incontrovertible statements against a UNP-SLFP alliance, the UNP, with the support of Peiris, agreed to form a government of “National Reconciliation.”
During his term as Prime Minister – from late 2001 to November 2003, Wickremesinghe repeatedly sought conciliation with a hostile Kumaratunga, but was repeatedly rebuffed.
Ultimately, the President – whose office wields extraordinary powers, compared to Palriament and the cabinet – seized three ministries from Wickremesinghe in November 2003, precipitating a governing crisis.
Several months later, in April 2004, an alliance between Kumaratunga’s SLFP and the JVP toppled Wickremesinghe’s UNP- led government.
As Sri Lankans go to the polls this week, Kumaratunga’s alliance continues to rule, but as a vulnerable minority government, the JVP having walked out in June 2005 in disgust at her plans to sign an aid-sharing deal with the Tamil Tigers.