Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, is set to sign a number of landmark agreements with Sri Lankan president, Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) during his three-day visit to Sri Lanka beginning Friday, 4th April.
In Colombo’s eyes, his visit signals the possibility to upscale both energy and communications capabilities of the island. This renewed Indo-Lanka trading partnership, championed by Delhi, aims to foster an economic boom — one unseen by the island’s young and long forgotten by the old. In the North-East, however, the narrative is slightly different. Modi’s visit presents an opportunity to push the Sri Lankan government for a coherent answer to the very problems that continue to trouble Eelam Tamils - the questions of self-determination, demilitarisation and accountability. One of the flagship projects inked on paper and awaiting Modi’s signature is the Indo-Lanka electricity grid connectivity project. Cables will be leaving from Madurai in Tamil Nadu, crossing the Palk Strait to Mannar, and extending to Anuradhapura in central Sri Lanka. Another large-scale project on Modi’s agenda is the 120-megawatt solar venture in Trincomalee. Both Mannar and Trincomalee regions are part of the Tamil homelands and remain heavily occupied by military presence. The North-East remains one of the most militarised regions in the world per capita. As with previous Sri Lankan governments, the NPP courts international trading partners by boasting a stable North East - not through genuine sovereignty but at the barrel of a gun.
When it comes to Sri Lanka’s economy, the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK) MP Shritharan Sivagnanam lambasted the government’s latest budget in late February of this year. He derided the LKR 442 billion spent on the army, navy and air force as part of their increased spending on defence despite the country falling from one economic crisis to another. More importantly, however, is that under the military’s oversight, Tamils face ongoing land disputes, forced displacement and unlawful land grabs.
Shritharan, in his parliamentary speech on the Budget, made a marked point that carefully placed the moral case for demilitarisation well within the economic debate. With 10.5% of the national budget now allocated to defence—a 3% increase from the previous year—the over-compensation of military oversight is no longer just a matter of political control but a significant economic burden. Sovereignty through political reformation costs next to nothing in fiscal terms, yet its denial comes at a growing financial price. Through their multiple dealings on energy infrastructure and communications technologies, Delhi is effectively paying a very expensive ‘security’ tax in a country, as Shritharan correctly notes, that has not been “in an active state of war for over 15 years”. It’s through this lens that Modi should heed the ITAK’s MP warning of the island’s inevitable failure to achieve meaningful economic growth without addressing its deep-rooted ethnic and political issues.
The likelihood of Modi lending an ear to a North-Eastern political demand should be judged against the backdrop of the NPP’s sudden reversal to fraternise with India. Prior to his election victory in 2024, AKD’s stance on India was a bleak one. Addressing his party’s veteran association just under two years ago, he decried then President Wickremesinghe’s proposal to connect with India’s oil and gas pipelines as fating Sri Lanka to an unbreakable knot - “we will be in a situation where we are unable — isn’t that so? — to take any political or economic decision apart from India!”
As the global economy reshapes around a protectionist America, India’s ambition for economic growth will increasingly rely on regional partners. Unlike India, smaller countries like Sri Lanka will be hit the hardest in the face of Trump’s tariffs and so, the once anti-Indian posture so strongly held by Sri Lanka’s political left will be reckoned with a rethinking, a re-forming. Ideas take longer to change, however. It won’t be surprising to see more and more militarisation of the North-East as the NPP compromises its Indo-phobia philosophy to account for more pressing national economic concerns. The veneer of Sinhala nationalism will have to be upheld somehow.
The question remains whether India will continue to pay for an expired ideology.