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The Director of Communications for Sri Lanka’s Presidential Media Division, Anuruddha Lokuhapuarachchi, has cast serious doubt on the Sri Lankan narrative surrounding two of the deadliest attacks on Sinhala civilians in 2006 — the Welikanda and Kebithigollewa massacres — and suggested that senior state-linked figures, including Pillayan and former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, may have had more to gain from the violence than the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
His post, titled "Ghosts in the Borderlands: Unraveling the Violent Legacy of Pillayan and the Politics of Impunity", raised questions about the motivations behind the killings and challenges long-standing state claims that the LTTE was responsible. He was recently appointed Director of International Media and Strategic Communications under the President’s Media Division.
In the post, Lokuhapuarachchi writes:
“Both atrocities were quickly blamed on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), helping to galvanize support for then-President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s war strategy... But nearly two decades later, new reflections raise difficult questions: Who truly orchestrated these killings? And did the real perpetrators find protection, not punishment, within the post-war political framework?”
The two attacks — the execution of 13 Sinhala farm workers in Welikanda in May 2006 and the Claymore mine attack on a civilian bus in Kebithigollewa in June that year, which killed over 60 people — were key moments that shaped domestic and international attitudes toward Sri Lanka’s conflict.
The LTTE denied involvement in both attacks and international monitors failed to produce conclusive evidence.
Lokuhapuarachchi, however, draws attention to the presence and operational control of the TMVP (Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal), a breakaway paramilitary faction led by Pillayan and Karuna Amman, who worked in close collaboration with Sri Lankan military intelligence. He argues that the LTTE's ability to stage such attacks in heavily militarised zones “is highly unlikely” without the complicity or at least the awareness of the TMVP or state forces.
“Who benefited?”
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Instead of asking who committed the attacks, the essay urges readers to consider who stood to gain. According to Lokuhapuarachchi:
“For Mahinda Rajapaksa, the attacks helped ignite nationalist sentiment and justify a decisive military response.
For Pillayan and the TMVP, the violence strengthened their position as loyal allies of the government, paving the way for political legitimacy…
For the broader state apparatus, these incidents discredited the LTTE and helped shift international sympathy.”
He notes that Pillayan’s political rise — including his appointment as Chief Minister of the Eastern Province — followed shortly after. He also recalls the mysterious 2008 assassination of Pillayan’s coordination secretary in a high-security area of Colombo, which he frames as an internal message from the same state machinery that once elevated Pillayan: “Serve, but never overstep.”
A legacy of impunity
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Lokuhapuarachchi’s article also traces Pillayan’s continued political survival despite repeated links to violent atrocities, including the assassination of Tamil MP Joseph Pararajasingham in 2005 and, more recently, allegations of links to the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings.
Though Pillayan was held in remand for five years for the Pararajasingham case, he was released in 2020 after key witnesses recanted. He was later questioned by Sri Lanka’s Terrorism Investigation Division in relation to the Easter attacks, though no formal charges were brought.
“If figures like Pillayan… can move freely through corridors of power — then reconciliation remains a myth, and justice a tool of convenience,” Lokuhapuarachchi concludes.
Past analysis and emerging questions
Lokuhapuarachchi’s remarks echo long-standing scepticism about the Kebithigollewa massacre in particular. A 2006 analysis in The Tamil Mirror by Roger Gnanaindran questioned how the LTTE could have planted Claymore mines in broad daylight within a heavily guarded Sinhala area just 45 minutes after a routine military sweep.
The article argued that only government-aligned actors, with prior knowledge of funeral arrangements and transport plans, could have orchestrated such an attack — one that also delivered immense international media exposure and justification for airstrikes on LTTE areas.
Furthermore, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), which blamed the LTTE for the attack, did so based on “motive, capability, and capacity” — not direct evidence — further illustrating how suspicion was institutionalised without scrutiny.